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GENDER DIVERSITY IN THE BOARDROOM 
AND ITS IMPACTS: IS THE EXAMPLE OF 
NORWAY A WAY FORWARD? 
BEATE SJÅFJELL∗  
Norway is one of the most egalitarian countries in the world, with a high level 
of gender equality and a high percentage of women at work. Nevertheless, 
mandatory rules appeared necessary to bring about changes in the 
composition of corporate boards. This article describes the coup that made 
Norway the first country in the world to mandate gender diversity on 
corporate boards and outlines Norway’s innovative legislative approach to 
this issue. The significance of gender diversity to corporate governance is 
discussed, drawing on empirical studies of the effect of diversity on the 
performance of companies. The article also discusses the potentially broader 
impact of gender diversity in the boardroom, including the pressing question 
of whether gender diversity in the boardroom can help companies create 
sustainable value within the planetary boundaries.  
I INTRODUCTION: WHY IS THIS STILL AN ISSUE? 
It seems logical and obvious that limiting oneself to only men or only women 
in any corporate setting may diminish the potential for constructive and open-
minded discussions that may improve the company’s performance and its 
relationship to society. Detrimental group-think is a risk in any very 
homogeneous context. Conversely, the positive effects of gender, cultural, age 
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and other diversity are well-known.1 Experienced business people tell us that 
having a heterogeneous board is fruitful. So, as one of the male presenters, Peter 
Lamell, observed at the Forum on Mandatory Gender Quota Legislation held 
on 20 October 2014 in Melbourne: ‘Why don’t they get it’? Why the resistance, 
or, formulated positively, the very slow progress, which underpins the 
discussion of whether to legislate to achieve change?   
The example of Norway is striking here. Norway is one of the most egalitarian 
countries in the world, with a high level of gender equality and a high 
percentage of women at work. Nevertheless, as this article outlines, mandatory 
rules appeared necessary to bring about the desired change in the composition 
of company boards — businesses did not do this on their own, in spite of a long 
grace period. The explanation of why they ‘don’t get it’ seems to be a 
combination of path-dependency, power and money.2 
This article goes on in Part II to describe the coup that made Norway the first 
country in the world to introduce this rule, and the innovative legislative 
approach which Norway took. In Part III, the Norwegian rule is elaborated on, 
with discussion of its background as a corporate governance — rather than 
gender equality — initiative, and of the compliance with the rule by Norwegian 
companies.   
In Part IV, the article discusses the effect of the rule, after first elaborating on 
the challenges and uncertainties connected with such a discussion. With these 
caveats, the corporate governance significance of gender diversity is discussed, 
drawing on empirical studies of the effect of the rule on the companies’ 
performance. This may be especially relevant given the discussion that the 
Norwegian rule has inspired in many jurisdictions around the world. The article 
also discusses the potentially broader impact of gender diversity in the 
boardroom, including the pressing question of whether gender diversity in the 
boardroom can help companies create sustainable value within the planetary 
boundaries.  
1 See also Lawrence J Trautman, ‘Corporate Boardroom Diversity: Why Are We Still Talking 
about This?’ (2014) 17 The Scholar: St Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice. 
Available at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2047750>. 
2 That I am the only female company law professor in Norway and one of two in the whole Nordic 
region also illustrates the male dominance still visible in business law and more generally in 
the economy. See ‘Surprisingly Few Female Company Law Scholars’ at the University of Oslo 
website <http://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/areas/companies/news/company-law-and-
women.html> which provides the background for Daughters of Themis: International Network 
of Female Business Scholars. See under Networks at the website for the research group 
Companies, Markets, Society and the Environment <http://jus.uio.no/companies>. 
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Part V concludes with some reflections on whether Norway is indeed an 
example to follow in this respect. 
II THE STORY OF A COUP BY TABLOID 
Ironically, in the end, it was a man who performed what may be denoted a coup 
by tabloid and gave Norway the first mandatory corporate gender quota rule in 
the world. In 2002, the then Minister of Trade and Industry, Ansgar Gabrielsen, 
proposed to make it obligatory for public limited liability companies in Norway 
to have at least 40 per cent women directors on their boards.3 The minister 
voiced the proposal in a tabloid newspaper, apparently without checking this 
idea with the prime minister — or anybody else in the government or in the 
ministry. In an interview Mr Gabrielsen later revealed that this was a carefully 
planned strategy: the perceived problem with unequal gender representation on 
the boards (referred to disparagingly as ‘boys’ clubs’) had long been a topic of 
debate, albeit not one that had created big headlines. The minister feared that 
putting the proposal through the normal channels first would cause its quiet 
death, smothered by corporate lobby forces and a bureaucracy sceptical of such 
drastic measures.4 Leaving this to business to sort out also did not seem to be 
an option, as the percentage of female directors on the boards of Norwegian 
companies in the twenty years from 1992 had only increased from four to six 
per cent, despite ‘a multitude of voluntary efforts’.5 
Going to the tabloids certainly got the minister attention: ‘I got a real telling-
off in the next meeting of ministers. Some of them practically had smoke 
coming out of their ears’.6 But in the end, the then Norwegian Prime Minister 
Kjell Magne Bondevik supported the proposal. It would probably have been 
quite difficult for a Christian Democrat Prime Minister to say that he was 
against it. He had, indeed, together with the rest of the government, been 
presented with a fait accompli.   
 
3 More precisely, at least 40 per cent of each gender, but as the perceived problem has been male 
dominance, the de facto effect is one of a radical quota system to get women onto boards. 
4 ‘Han skaffet 800 styrekvinner’ [He Got 800 Women onto the Boards], Aftenposten, 4 February 
2008) 2–3. 
5 Morten Huse and Marina Brogi, ‘Introduction’ in Silke Machold et al (eds), Getting Women on 
to Corporate Boards: A Snowball Starting in Norway (Edward Elgar, 2013) 1.  
6 ‘Han skaffet 800 styrekvinner’, above n 4.  
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The strategy worked, and the new section 6-11a of the Norwegian Public 
Limited Liability Companies Act entered into force on 1 January 2006.7  
However, its entry into force was indirectly the choice of business. This 
legislative initiative took an innovative approach: the legislation enacted in 
2003 stipulated that the rule would enter into force only if companies did not, 
by 1 July 2005, in aggregate have 40 per cent representation by women on their 
boards.  
In spite of protestations beforehand that business would sort this out itself if left 
alone, a full two year period after the passing of the legislation (following a 
number of years during which the discussion had flared up from time to time) 
was not sufficient to produce the required numbers. By July 2005 there were 
only 15.5 per cent women on boards of public companies and as many as 80 
public companies had not reached 40 per cent of each gender.8 The rule 
therefore entered into force, giving business another two years to comply.   
Although this was a gender-neutral rule, the existing male dominance on boards 
of public companies meant that a large number of women directors had to be 
recruited within a two year period. In spite of strong protests, in the end all 
Norwegian public companies complied. However, a large number of public 
companies reincorporated as private companies, a fact which has been blamed 
on the gender diversity rule. As will be seen below, however, the existence of 
other factors explaining the re-incorporations seems to have been overlooked.  
7 Allmennaksjeloven, lov av 13. Juni 1997 nr. 45 (Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies 
Act of 13 June 1997 No 45), available in an unofficial English translation at the website of the 
Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslo Børs) <http://www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Regulations/ 
Acts-and-regulations>.  
8 Espen Bolshaug, ‘Flere kvinner i norske styrer — Bra Eller Dårlig?’ [More Women on 
Norwegian Boards — Bad or Good?] (2011) Magma <http://www.magma.no/flere-kvinner-i-
norske-styrer-bra-eller-darlig?tid=213203>. Of course, an increase to 15.5 per cent was a large 
jump relatively speaking but the legislature had made up its mind and the limits of its patience 
had been exceeded. 
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III THE NORWEGIAN GENDER DIVERSITY RULE 
A Scope, Aim and Type of Regulation 
The rule in section 6-11a applies to all public companies — in other words, not 
just listed companies.9 These include all Norwegian public limited liability 
companies registered in the Norwegian Register of Business Enterprises.10   
The gender equality rule in section 6-11a does not apply to private limited 
liability companies. Private companies were excluded because they normally 
have shares that are less dispersed than those of public companies (as only 
public companies can offer shares to the public), and also because Norwegian 
private companies are typically family-controlled, with the shareholders also 
being the members of the board.11 
Better corporate governance was at the heart of this bold legislative move.12 
The main legislative purpose of section 6-11a was to recruit more women into 
the boardrooms for the sake of the performance and competitiveness of the 
companies.13 Contrary to popular opinion, its purpose was not first and 
foremost to increase gender equality for the sake of the underrepresented gender 
(although that was also a legislative objective). The idea was that when 
companies were faced with this rule they would have to widen their scope and 
pick the best qualified persons for directorships, instead of restricting the search 
to the ‘old boys’ club’. 
9 These companies, allmennaksjeselskap in Norwegian, are in Australia also referred to as public 
companies limited by shares and may or may not be listed, as is the case in Norway. See 
<http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Organisation-Type/ 
Organisation-definitions> for Australian company types. 
10 See the Norwegian Register of Business Enterprises Act 1985 ss 1–2. (Norwegian Acts are 
available on <www.lovdata.no>, but only in Norwegian. Some Acts are available in unofficial 
translations from the following link: <www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulov/>).   
11 See more about the effect of this distinction between public and private companies in Part IV 
below. 
12 It has, however, been indicated that denoting improved corporate governance as the main 
objective was a strategic move, as better corporate governance was easier to sell than gender 
equality. See along these lines Huse and Brogi, above n 5. 
13 Ot prp nr 97 (2002–2003) <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/otprp-nr-97-2002-
2003-/id127203/?ch=1>. Propositions to the Odelsting (Ot prp) are used when the government 
proposes new laws or the cancellation of or amendments to existing laws, and they are often 
only available in Norwegian.   
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The legislative mechanism chosen was a mandatory quota rule, as opposed to 
‘comply or explain’ rules or target rules, under which companies are merely 
required to report on their progress.14 
B The Specifics of the Rule 
Section 6-11a requires a certain minimum of both genders to be represented on 
the board of directors in public companies. The text of section 6-11a is gender-
neutral, but its history shows that it is informed by the previous male 
domination in the boardrooms of public companies.  
For the companies with the smallest boards, the rule requires only that each 
gender be represented, while the larger boards need to comply with the rule 
requiring 40 per cent of each gender. It is this latter requirement for which the 
Norwegian rule is best known.  
The rule is specified in section 6-11a in the following manner: 
1. If the board of directors has two or three members, both genders shall 
be represented. 
2. If the board of directors has four or five members, each gender shall 
be represented with at least two members. 
3. If the board of directors has six to eight members, each gender shall 
be represented with at least three members.  
4. If the board of directors has nine members, each gender shall be 
represented with at least four members, and if the board of directors 
has more than nine members, each gender shall be represented with at 
least 40 per cent of the board of directors.15  
Section 6-11a applies to both directors of the board and alternate directors, 
regardless of whether the directors are elected by the shareholders in the general 
meeting or by the employees according to the Norwegian co-determination 
14 While the Norwegian rule has inspired many other countries to follow in Norway’s footsteps, 
Norway is still one of the few countries with a true quota rule, mandating that the board consist 
of a certain percentage of each gender. Germany has recently followed this course, albeit only 
for some of the largest listed companies; see below n 32 on new legislation to enter into force 
in 2016. 
15 English text from the unofficial translation available on the website of the Oslo Stock 
Exchange, above n 7. 
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rules.16 The gender representation is calculated separately for the directors 
elected by the general meeting, and those chosen by the employees. Giving the 
gender equality rule this common application prevents circumvention of the 
rule, but, as shown below, it can also raise other issues not regulated by the text 
in section 6-11a.  
With section 6-11a being such a new and, in the eyes of many, radical rule, both 
scepticism and criticism were foreseeable. Many Norwegian legal scholars and 
other critics have aired their views on some of the uncertainties concerning the 
application of section 6-11a. Questions have, for example, been raised 
regarding the situation where one director resigns. Do the demands for gender 
equality in section 6-11a then apply to the originally elected board of directors 
or to the remaining board with one director less? This is, however, not a new 
issue arising with the gender equality rule. The same question arises in 
connection with other statutory provisions concerning the composition of the 
board: for example, the requirement concerning the total number of directors 
and the requirement concerning residence of the directors. According to the 
Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act when a director resigns the 
remaining directors are as a rule compelled to choose a new director in such a 
way that the board at all times is lawfully constituted.17 The consequence is that 
if, for example, a female director resigns, the board must choose a new female 
director, if this is necessary to comply with the 40 per cent rule.  
Questions concerning alternate directors have also been raised. What is the 
situation if the gender representation amongst the alternate directors does not 
comply with section 6-11a? Will the sanction in that case also be dissolution of 
the company? Taking into account the severity of the sanction, the legal 
department of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice has stated that the company 
will not be dissolved in this situation. What the sanction instead would be is not 
yet clear, however, as companies tend not to push the point. And what if an 
alternate director actually steps in for a director of the opposite gender with the 
consequence that the board on the face of it no longer fulfils the gender 
requirement of section 6-11a? The answer here is probably that section 6-11a 
applies to the elected board, so for an alternate director with the ‘wrong’ gender 
to step in will not constitute a violation of the gender equality rule.  
16 See the Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act 1997 ss 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-37.  
17 Ibid s 6-8, supported by a statement from the legal department of the Ministry of Justice. 
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C Consequence of Non-Compliance 
The Norwegian Register of Business Enterprises is the legal authority 
responsible for ensuring that the boards of companies act in accordance with 
section 6-11a. A company acting in breach of section 6-11a is sanctioned in 
accordance with the ordinary rules applicable to inadequate compliance with 
legal provisions concerning the composition of the board in public companies.18  
One important type of sanction is denial of registration in the Register of 
Business Enterprises, which has major consequences for the operation of the 
company. The most dramatic sanction is dissolution of an existing company.19 
However, an actual dissolution is effected only after several warnings and 
opportunities for the company to put together a legally compliant board.    
The Norwegian public companies were obliged to have the required number of 
women in their boardrooms by 1 January 2008. By the end of 2007, 483 public 
companies were registered in the Norwegian Register of Business Enterprises. 
By 7 January 2008, 90 per cent of the public companies had boards in 
accordance with section 6-11a. A few months into 2008 all Norwegian public 
companies had the necessary number of women on their boards. Although there 
were a few reported instances of companies being notified about possible 
sanctions if they did not comply within an individually set deadline,20 the 
Register of Business Enterprises reports that no companies actually had to be 
sanctioned for acting in breach of the rule.  
In an article about the Norwegian study by Siv Staubo, the forced dissolution 
of companies that do not have a lawful board is characterised as imposing a 
‘death sentence’ on companies.21 This seems to be overly emotional. First, 
companies are not human beings. They do not have a life independent of law 
and can therefore not be put to death. Companies are, as the Court of Justice of 
the European Union has repeatedly pointed out, ‘creatures of national law’.22 
These legal entities therefore exist in as far, and for as long, as they comply 
with certain fundamental rules of company law which their founders have 
18 See, eg, s 6-11 concerning the place of residence of the directors, and s 6-4 concerning 
codetermination.   
19 Ibid s 16-15.  
20 Robert Anderson, ‘Norway Rushes in Female Directors’ Financial Times (online), 31 
December 2007 < http://on.ft.com/1IfEutu>. 
21 Audun Farbrot, ‘Gender-Quota Boardrooms Come at a High Price’ Science Nordic (online), 
15 February 2014 <http://sciencenordic.com/gender-quota-boardrooms-come-high-price>. 
22 See, eg, VALE Építési Kft (C-378/10) [2012] ECJ 440, a case in the Court of Justice of the 
European Union with a preliminary ruling from the Magyar Köztársaság Legfelsőbb Bírósága 
(Hungary).  
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chosen for the company. Having a lawful board is such a fundamental 
requirement.  
At the time the legislation was passed, dissolution of a company was criticised 
as a disproportionate sanction for the company not acting in accordance with 
section 6-11a.23 However, the preparatory works emphasise that dissolution is 
the most effective sanction, and thus also the most appropriate.24 The sanction 
is, from a Norwegian company law perspective, completely in line with that 
which applies when other fundamental requirements are breached, including 
the requirements of sending in accounts according to the Accounting Act and of 
having an auditor. As opposed to much CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) 
regulation,25 which either does not have teeth to start with or is not enforced, 
the Norwegian mandatory gender quota rule is dealt with as core company law 
should be — seriously. This in itself is also indicative of the aim: better 
corporate governance, as opposed to reporting requirements on gender diversity 
as CSR regulation.26  
IV GENDER DIVERSITY AND ITS IMPACTS  
A What to Measure and How?  
As is well-known, measuring the impact of legislation is extremely demanding, 
especially when it is done with a view to assessing what the potential effect of 
similar reforms would be on other countries. A number of factors can influence 
the apparent results of legislation. When building on and comparing the results 
of empirical studies, it is crucial to have an understanding of the scope of the 
studies, including the business sectors, number of businesses frame that they 
relate to, and what has been measured and how. The recurring challenge is, of 
course, to understand when statistically significant correlations represent 
23 Ot prp nr 97 (2002-2003) Om lov om endringer i lov 13 juni 1997 nr 44 om aksjeselskaper, 
lov 13 juni 1997 nr 45 om allmennaksjeselskaper og vise andre lover ((Preparatory works: the 
Government’s proposal to the Norwegian Parliament for amendments to the Norwegian Private 
Limited Liability Companies Act of 13 June 1997 No 44, the Public Limited Liability 
Companies Act of 13 June 1997 No 45, and certain other Acts), section 6.3.4, 51. 
24 Ibid. 
25 An example here is the Norwegian CSR reporting rules, discussed in Sjåfjell, ‘Sustainable 
Companies: Barriers and Possibilities in Norwegian Company Law’ (2015) 11 International 
and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 1.  
26 Norway has for decades had reporting requirements for companies, under which the companies 
are meant to report on labour issues, gender equality and anti-discrimination measures as well 
as environmental performance, without that having had much effect. See Sjåfjell, ibid. 
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causality.27 Even where causality is assumed, the question of the direction of 
causality may be raised. The argument can, for example, be made that 
companies that have a good financial, social and environmental performance 
are also the companies that embrace diversity in the boardroom and amongst 
employees.28 Whether diversity causes good performance, or whether the 
converse is true, may be difficult to find out, even in the case of Norway where 
the strong exogenous ‘shock’ of the regulation provides an especially good 
basis for investigation. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to consider this complex issue in depth. 
Instead I will outline some of the measurable issues and challenges in assessing 
the effects of a gender diversity rule and then move on under the other headings 
of this Part to share some tentative reflections based on some of the studies in 
this area.  
Attempts can be made to measure the effect of a gender diversity rule in various 
contexts, some relatively straightforward but most of them more complex. An 
obvious, relatively uncomplicated, check is to see the change in the 
composition of the boards, although even here it may be difficult to say with 
certainty what would have happened over time independent of the rule. An 
effect which has received much public discussion is that on the registration of 
public companies, as critics of the rule have latched onto the fact that the 
number of public companies has fallen drastically since the introduction of the 
rule, from 554 to only 250 public companies in June 2014.29 Whether that can 
be attributed solely to the gender quota rule is, however, questionable.  
The financial performance of companies is the effect that the corporate world 
naturally is especially interested in. Although one might imagine that 
measuring impact based on financial performance is straightforward, this is not 
so. Financial performance is not one simple indicator that can be used to assess 
impact. Notably, it is necessary to distinguish between value creation in the 
company, profits as measured by the accounts, and returns to shareholders. 
Further, as is generally the case in company law and corporate governance 
discussions, market attitude needs to be distinguished from the real economic 
27 Katrin Hansen, ‘Women on Boards: What We Know, What We Do Not Yet Know and How 
We Should Further Advance Knowledge’ in Machold et al (eds), above n 5, 101, 102–3. 
28 See, eg, Jean du Plessis, James O’Sullivan and Ruth Rentschler, ‘Multiple Layers of Gender 
Diversity on Corporate Boards: To Force or Not to Force?’ (2014) 19(1) Deakin Law Review 
1. 
29 Information available in Norwegian from the Norwegian Register of Business Enterprises at 
<http://www.brreg.no/>, while more limited information is available in English at 
<http://www.brreg.no/english/>. 
                                                 
2015 GENDER DIVERSITY: THE EXAMPLE OF NORWAY 35 
performance of companies. Contrary to the belief that underpins the efficient 
market hypothesis, a share price is not necessarily a reliable indicator of how a 
company is run. Indeed, the fluctuation in the financial markets need not have 
much connection with the underlying real economy. An interlinked issue is the 
distinction between short-term and long-term effects and between perception 
and reality. These caveats may make comparing empirical studies or 
summarising the results near impossible.  
A perhaps even more complex impact to measure is the impact of gender 
diversity on the interrelated environmental and social performance of the 
company. This impact may be directly relevant to financial performance in the 
long run, while in itself being highly relevant to society. Whether introducing 
gender diversity onto boards will help companies contribute to the overarching 
societal goal of sustainable development is hardly possible to measure but it is 
nevertheless a crucial issue to discuss. 
Also discussed in Norway has been the impact that the diversity rule has had 
— or not had — on the broader social norms concerning gender diversity in 
business, as will be shown below. 
Perhaps somewhat easier to ascertain is that this Norwegian initiative has 
indeed inspired many other countries as well as the EU to put the issue of 
corporate gender diversity on their agendas. A number of countries have 
enacted, or proposed, or are considering proposing, or at least recommending, 
similar legislation. National examples include Sweden as far back as 2003,30 
Spain in 200831 and, most recently, Germany.32 The issue has also been debated 
30 ‘However, no real progress was made until Ms Winberg became deputy prime minister last 
year. In a newspaper interview in late November, she demanded that at least 25 per cent of 
Swedish board members be female by 2004 or quotas would be enforced’: ‘Sweden’s Glass 
Ceiling Begins to Crack’ Financial Times, 12 May 2003.  
31 ‘Spain’s male-dominated business elite also watered down some statutes in Mr Zapatero’s 
gender equality law, which now recommends, but does not require, publicly listed companies 
to have an equal number of men and women directors and senior managers’, Leslie Crawford, 
‘“Feminist” Zapatero puts focus on women’ Financial Times (online), 16 April 2008 
<http://on.ft.com/1IfEB8p>. 
32 The German legislation, which will come into force in 2016, mandates a 30 per cent gender 
quota for the supervisory boards (Aufsichtsrat) of the largest of the German listed companies: 
‘Germany backs quotas for women on boards’ Financial Times (online), 26 November 2014 
<http://on.ft.com/1rux12U>. The German legislation was finally approved in March 2015: 
‘Germany passes gender quota legislation for the boardroom’ The Guardian (online), 6 March 
2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/mar/06/germany-gender-quota-legislation-
boardroom-law-women>. According to Adams, Gray and Nowland, Spain passed guidelines in 
2007 to encourage companies to increase the share of female directors to 40 per cent by 2015, 
and in 2010 the French National Assembly proposed a law that will impose 20 per cent gender 
quotas on boards of listed French companies within three years of the law’s adoption and 40 
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by the European Union (EU) in the years since Norway’s initiative, culminating 
in a proposal for a new directive which aims to achieve 40 per cent of each 
gender among non-executive directors (supervisory board members in a dual 
board system) by 2020.33 As opposed to the Norwegian rule, this is not a quota 
obligation. Rather it is, in the words of the EU Commission, a ‘procedural 
quota: the proposed Directive sets out a fair and transparent board selection 
process until the 40% objective is achieved’.34 However, the EU Council was 
not able to reach agreement on the Directive in December 2014 and it appears 
an open question whether such an agreement will ever be achieved.35 On the 
positive side, on aggregate EU businesses and shareholders appear now to be 
reacting to the political and regulatory signals, with the number of female 
directors on boards of large European companies rising from 11.9 per cent in 
October 2010 to 18.6 per cent in April 2014.36 
B Effect on the Composition of Boards 
One of the results of the Norwegian rule has undoubtedly been that there are 
many more female directors in public companies in Norway than there ever 
were before. Interestingly, female directors have replaced male directors. As 
there is no maximum number of directors according to company law, a way 
around this mandatory requirement in practice could have been to just appoint 
the necessary number of token female directors. The male directors could then 
have had their informal meetings beforehand, with the actual board meetings as 
pro forma board meetings, where the female directors were met with a fait 
accompli from their male colleagues. There is no indication that this has taken 
place in aggregate.  
per cent quotas after six years. Similar laws are currently awaiting final enactment in Belgium, 
Italy and the Netherlands. Other countries, such as Australia and the UK, are asking companies 
to set voluntary boardroom gender quotas or disclose diversity policies: Renée B Adams, 
Stephen Gray and John Nowland, ‘Does Gender Matter in the Boardroom? Evidence from the 
Market Reaction to Mandatory New Director Announcements’ (2011), available at SSRN 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1953152>. 
33 Improving the Gender Balance in Company Boardrooms (27 June 2014) European 
Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/gender-equality/index_en.htm>. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Council of the European Union, ‘Outcome of the Council Meeting: Employment, Social 
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs’ (Press Release, 16803/1/14 REV 1, 11 December 2014) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=40802194630>. 
36 Gender Balance on Corporate Boards — Europe is Cracking the Glass Ceiling (24 September 
2014) European Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women 
onboards/wob-factsheet_2014_en.pdf>.  
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Furthermore, the word of mouth amongst company lawyers who were opposed 
to the rule to start with (and even amongst those still opposed to that type of 
legislation) is that the effect of the rule has been to bring the best women in and 
to force some of the less competent men out. If this is true, companies in the 
aggregate have better boards than they had before the enterprising minister took 
matters into his own hands and called the tabloids. A Danish newspaper has put 
this into print, stating that Norwegian boards have got rid of the least competent 
male directors and replaced them with ‘top qualified, top motivated women’ as 
a direct consequence of section 6-11a.37 
Yet another, probably unintended, consequence of section 6-11a has been 
mentioned in the Norwegian media: the rule has led to a number of Danish 
women being recruited into Norwegian boards and therefore increased the 
Nordic representation in the administrative organs of Norwegian public 
companies.38  
There has undoubtedly been an increase in cultural diversity through the 
breaking up of the ‘old boys’ club’, and the resulting need to look outside of 
the traditional circles for competent directors. Studies have shown, for example, 
that there has been a certain increase in age diversity.39 We will probably also 
see an increase in social and ethnic diversity over time, as female directors tend 
to be better-educated than their male colleagues.40 When a selection is made 
based on education and formal qualifications rather than on social status and 
connections, this opens up new possibilities for well-qualified people with other 
social and ethnic backgrounds than, to simplify the picture somewhat, the 
typical middle-aged white male director from Oslo west. 
37 ‘Udugelige styremenn forsvunnet?’ (‘Have incompetent male board members disappeared?’) 
Ukeavisen ledelse (Norwegian weekly newspaper) 7 March 2008, citing the views in an article 
in the Danish newspaper Berlingske that the quality of Norwegian corporate boards has 
increased.  
38 See ‘Danske kvinner eksporteres til Norge’ (‘Danish women are exported to Norway’), E24 
(large Norwegian online business newspaper) (online) 20 April 2008.  
39 Female directors tended to be younger: Kenneth R Ahern and Amy K Dittmar, ‘The Changing 
of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation’ 
(2012) 127(1) Quarterly Journal of Economics 137, available at SSRN 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364470>. 
40 Ibid. 
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C Effect on Registration of Public Companies 
At the time of enactment of the Norwegian rule, it was pointed out that limiting 
the application of section 6-11a to public companies might influence the 
organisation of businesses.  
An article in a Norwegian internet-based newspaper asserted that section 6-11a 
played a key role when the company structure of the Norwegian corporate 
group Aker was developed.41 The listed public company Aker Kværner is a 
subsidiary controlled by the main shareholders (the Norwegian businessman 
Kjell Inge Røkke, the Swedish Wallenberg family, and the Norwegian state) of 
the private company Aker Holding. The newspaper article claimed that this 
organisational choice was a result of section 6-11a, as the intention of 
structuring the parent company as a private company was to avoid the gender 
equality rule. The article did not, on the other hand, go into the fact that the 
choice of type of company for Aker Holding is an obvious one considering that 
the parent company has only the three abovementioned shareholders.42  
Even more directly, a landslide of reorganisation of businesses from public to 
private companies and a tumble in new registrations of public companies was 
predicted. On the face of it, this prediction seems to have held true. The number 
of public companies registered in Norway has fallen by over 50 per cent. 
However, to conclude that this is due to the gender quota rule appears somewhat 
hasty. A survey of 108 of the 126 companies that re-registered in 2007 and 2008 
indicated that most companies re-registered for other reasons (that it was more 
convenient or practical to be a private company, that changes in the law 
rendered it unnecessary for financial companies to be public companies, and 
that the company had restructured).43 Only a very small number of the re-
registrations could be directly attributed to the gender quota rule.44 Whether 
this holds true for companies registering after 2008 is an open question, as is 
the question of whether the gender quota rule is a disincentive for choosing the 
public corporate form. A tentative impression, based on informal discussions, 
is that the gender diversity rule is accepted as much as, or even more than, the 
41 Johann D Sundberg and Frank Ertesvåg, ‘Unngår kvinnekravet’ [‘Avoiding the Gender 
Equality Rule’] E24, 26 June 2007 <e24.no/boers-og-finans/article1856055.ece>. 
42 The shareholders in this parent company have a shareholder agreement according to which 
they ‘acknowledge the need for both genders to be represented on the board of directors’, 
although of course anything else would have been a difficult PR issue for the Norwegian 
government: ibid. 
43 Vibecke Heidenreich, ‘Consequences of the Norwegian Gender Quota Regulation for Public 
Limited Company Boards’ in Machold et al (eds), above n 5, 123. 
44 Ibid. 
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rule on employee-elected directors and that it should not in itself be a barrier to 
registering a public company today.45  
Even if one could identify the percentage of this fall in the number of public 
companies that can be attributed to the Norwegian rule on gender diversity, this 
would not tell us whether the rule in itself is good — only that some corporate 
decision-makers react negatively to the rule.46 In our era of globalisation when 
businesses may often choose not only the corporate form that they will adopt 
but often also the country in which they will register, a certain degree of 
regulatory competition is unavoidable.  
D Effect on Financial Performance of Companies 
Discerning whether, and to what extent, and in what way gender diversity has 
an effect on the financial performance of companies is one of the most difficult 
and contested issues in this area. Before considering the studies specific to the 
Norwegian example, it is useful to take a broader view and look at the general 
picture of what research tells us about the impact of gender diversity.  
Generally, studies seem to indicate that gender diversity has a positive effect 
on company performance. An example is the research by Lynda Gratton and 
Lamia Walker, which they present in the Financial Times in October 2007, 
emphasising that ‘[t]eam members of both sexes identify that working groups 
with 50 per cent men and 50 per cent women deliver optimal performance in 
most areas that drive innovation’.47 They go on to state that ‘[g]ender 
imbalances create a significant deterioration in knowledge-based work with 
regard to experimentation, knowledge transfer, the capacity to work across 
functional or business boundaries, and general efficiency’.48  
This is not one isolated research report either. Gratton and Walker state that this 
research 
supports a number of recent studies that show the positive effect of gender 
parity in business. This year alone, three studies found consistent evidence 
45 Ibid 125. 
46 A different perspective may be found in Øyvind Bøhren and Siv Staubo, ‘Does Mandatory 
Gender Balance Work? Changing Organizational Form to Avoid Board Upheaval’ (2013) 
Journal of Corporate Finance, forthcoming, available at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2257769>. 
47 Lynda Gratton and Lamia Walker, ‘Gender Equality: A Solid Business Case at Last’ Financial 
Times (online), 28 October 2007 <http://on.ft.com/Ohw0fg>. 
48 Ibid. 
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for the business case. McKinsey reports that better-than-average financial 
performance is experienced by European companies with the highest 
proportion of women in leadership roles. Research at the University of 
Helsinki finds that companies with female chief executives or board directors 
achieve a 10 percent higher return on capital, regardless of the company or 
sector, while Catalyst reports that Fortune 500 companies with the highest 
proportion of female directors are more profitable and efficient, on average, 
than those with the lowest.49 
A deeper examination of the empirical research generally supports the 
impression given by Gratton and Walker that female directors have something 
positive to offer in breaking up the group-think of homogeneous male boards. 
According to Renée Adams and Patricia Funk, female directors are more 
benevolent and universally concerned, as well as less power-oriented, than 
men. As opposed to a popular myth, their study also finds that women are less 
traditional and security-oriented than their male colleagues and slightly more 
risk-loving.50 Breaking up group-think through promoting diversity on boards 
is crucial, because, as Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers points out, group-think brings 
with it ‘three risks: excessive self-esteem, the creation of tunnel vision and a 
strong pressure within the group to come to an agreement’, which ‘threaten the 
independent and critical view needed’ for good governance and management.51 
As Adams and Funk point out, group-think and lack of critical opposition may 
have contributed to the financial crises that have been seen over the last years.52 
It is interesting and very challenging to assess the impact in Norway of the 
introduction of the gender diversity rule. In one way the Norwegian case 
provides a unique opportunity to study the effect of gender diversity which was 
suddenly brought into the companies through the exogenous ‘shock’ of 
49 Ibid. See for a perhaps opposing opinion, Øyvind Bøhren and R Øystein Strøm, ‘The Value-
Creating Board: Theory and Evidence’ (Research Report No 8, BI Norwegian School of 
Management, Department of Financial Economics, 2005) <http://www1.uis.no/ansatt/ 
odegaard/governance/Report_Boards.pdf>. 
50 Renée B Adams and Patricia Funk, ‘Beyond the Glass Ceiling: Does Gender Matter?’ (Finance 
Working Paper No 273, UPF Working Paper Series, 2009), available at SSRN 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1475152>.  
51 Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers, ‘A Comparison of Gender Diversity in the Codes of France, 
Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom’ (2010), available at SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1585280>. 
52 Adams and Funk, above n 50, 2, also indicating that the male domination of financial firms 
may have contributed to the poor performance of banks. See also Darren Rosenblum, 
‘Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative’ (2009) 6(1) Berkeley Business Law Journal 55, 
81, available at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430508>. 
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mandatory legislation requiring ‘overnight’53 board changes, rather than the 
gradual development (or stagnation) of company board structures that one 
otherwise saw. However, the mandatory nature of the rule and the negative 
reaction that that in itself entails, especially in a front-runner country, may 
conversely make measuring the impact of the changes during the first years 
difficult. 
Within the limited scope of this article, a tentative impression of the impact of 
gender diversity is attempted, drawing both on studies specific to Norway and 
studies from other jurisdictions. As pointed out above, we must attempt to 
distinguish between studies that tell us something about the effect firstly on the 
value creation in the company, secondly on the profits as measured by the 
accounts, and thirdly on dividends to shareholders. A study by David Matsa 
and Amalia Miller shows lower short-term profits in Norwegian companies 
affected by the rule than in other Nordic companies unaffected by the rule.54 
This study gives valuable insight by establishing, through investigation, that the 
reduction in Norwegian profits appears to be caused by a relative increase in 
labour costs because of fewer lay-offs.55 A Danish study by Nina Smith, 
Valdemar Smith and Mette Verner indicates that the proportion of women 
among top executives and on boards of directors tends to have a significantly 
positive effect on company performance, understood as profits.56 A study by 
Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers of Dutch listed companies with and without women 
board members finds that companies with women board members produce 
better returns on equity than those without women board members.57 In the 
Norwegian context, Knut Nygaard finds positive effects on returns for 
businesses where there was low information asymmetry between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’, with female directors often belonging to the ‘outsider’ category in 
relation to the CEO as ‘insider’. He further finds an insignificantly negative 
53 The changes were not really required overnight, but it may have been perceived that way. See 
Part II above describing the two two-year grace periods. 
54 David A Matsa and Amalia R Miller, ‘A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence 
from Quotas’ (2012) American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, forthcoming, available 
at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636047>. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Nina Smith, Valdemar Smith and Mette Verner, ‘Do Women in Top Management Affect Firm 
Performance? A Panel Study of 2500 Danish Firms’ (Discussion Paper No 1708, IZA, 2005) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=780910>. The authors use four alternative measures of profit to 
ensure the robustness of their results: 1. Gross value added/net turnover; 2. Profit on ordinary 
operations/net turnover; 3. Ordinary result/net assets; and 4. Net result after tax/net assets. 
57 Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers, ‘Women on Boards and Firm Performance’ (2010) 17(2) Journal 
of Management & Governance 491, available at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1586832>.  
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effect where the information asymmetry is high.58 Generally, gender diversity 
is found to be either positive or neutral for the performance of the business.59  
A fundamental distinction lies also between the actual impact of a rule on the 
company, its decision-making and its performance, and the market perception 
of that rule. A number of studies focus on market perception. These tend to 
indicate that shareholders and potential investors reacted negatively to the 
mandatory Norwegian rule. For example, a study by Kenneth Ahern and Amy 
Dittmar reports a ‘significant drop in the stock price at the announcement of the 
law’.60 Such studies do not necessarily tell us anything about the real effect on 
the business of gender diversity on the board, only that (male?) shareholders 
and financial analysts are unhappy with the perceived constraints of new 
mandatory rules. In certain contexts there may also be a ‘shareholder bias’ 
against gender diversity (or rather against women on boards) as highlighted by 
Jean du Plessis et al.61 Conversely, Renée Adams, Stephen Gray and John 
Nowland show us that announcements of new female directors were received 
positively in Australia, where there was at the time no mandatory quota.62 Also, 
as mentioned above, Nygaard indicates positive investor expectations where 
there is low information asymmetry between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ and 
where female directors, typically ‘outsiders’, could expect fewer information 
asymmetry disadvantages.63 When Ahern and Dittmar attempt to discern 
whether lower age, higher education (!) and different business experience may 
have had a negative effect on the board’s influence on the operations of the 
companies, they seem to indicate that an explanatory factor may be male 
resistance to the female directors.64  
This indicates that any negative effects may be of a transitional nature. 
However, there are also studies, such as the Norwegian study by Øyvind 
58 Knut Nygaard, ‘Forced Board Changes: Evidence from Norway’ (Discussion Paper, NHH 
(Norwegian School of Economics) Department of Economics, 2011), available at SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793227>. 
59 Trautman, above n 1; see also above n 30. 
60 Ahern and Dittmar, above n 39. 
61 Du Plessis, O’Sullivan and Rentschler, above n 28, 7–8, with reference to Frank Dobbin and 
Jiwook Jung, ‘Corporate Board Gender Diversity and Stock Performance: The Competence 
Gap or Institutional Investor Bias?’ (2011) 89 North Carolina Law Review 809, 819. 
62 Adams, Gray and Nowland, above n 32. A positive effect is found also by Collins G Ntim, 
‘Board Diversity and Organizational Valuation: Unravelling the Effects of Ethnicity and 
Gender’ (2013) Journal of Management and Governance, forthcoming, available at SSRN 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2338073>. Ntim argues that ethnic diversity is valued even more 
highly than gender diversity: at 24. 
63 Nygaard, above n 58. 
64 Adams, Gray and Nowland, above n 32.   
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Bøhren and Øystein Strøm, claiming that there should be no mandatory gender 
quotas, no rights for employees to elect board members and no independent 
directors, since companies that are closely controlled by shareholders provide 
superior financial results.65 
As profits and returns can be influenced by a number of factors independent of 
the introduction of the gender diversity rule, any insights into the internal effect 
on the board — on the decision-making and the assumed impact that that has 
on the value-creation in the company — may be seen as particularly helpful for 
our understanding.66  
A study of US companies suggests that the inclusion of more women on boards 
has a positive influence on the board in that attendance of members at board 
meetings improves and so does monitoring of the company. This has a positive 
effect on companies where better monitoring is required (but possibly a 
negative effect on companies that were already well-monitored).67 Comparing 
the Norwegian quota rule to the ‘less interventionist regulatory approach’ of the 
US, Aaron Dhir finds that the Norwegian model produces benefits that improve 
the boards’ decision-making.68 Similarly, a study of the French quota rule by 
Darren Rosenblum and Daria Roithmayr indicates that gender diversity on the 
board leads to more open-ended board discussions.69  
Sabina Nielsen and Morten Huse have gone beneath the surface, drawing upon 
theories of gender differences and group effectiveness, in their in-depth study 
of 201 Norwegian companies, opening the ‘black box’ of board behaviour.70 
Nielsen and Huse indicate that women’s ability to contribute positively to the 
board may be attributed to their different leadership styles. The presence of 
65 See for example Øyvind Bøhren and R Øystein Strøm, ‘Governance and Politics: Regulating 
Independence and Diversity in the Board Room’ (2010) 37 Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting 1281, available at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2257734>. 
66 See, eg, Tor Brunzell and Eva Liljeblom, ‘Gender Representation in Nordic Boards: Evaluation 
of Board Work’ (2012) on the difficulty of evaluating the gender diversity effect on financial 
performance because of the variety of other factors that can influence this performance: 
available at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1988826>. 
67 Renée B Adams and Daniel Ferreira, ‘Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on 
Governance and Performance’ (2008), available at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1107721>. 
68 Aaron A Dhir, ‘Homogeneous Corporate Governance Cultures’ (2014), available at SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2487149>. 
69 Darren Rosenblum and Daria Roithmayr, ‘More than a Woman: Insights into Corporate 
Governance after the French Sex Quota’ (2014), available at SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2482720>. 
70 Sabina Nielsen and Morten Huse, ‘The Contribution of Women on Boards of Directors: Going 
Beyond the Surface’ (2010) 18(2) Corporate Governance: An International Review 136. 
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women on corporate boards seems to increase board effectiveness through 
reducing the level of conflict and ensuring a high quality of board development 
activities.71  
An inside view is also provided by Tor Brunzell and Eva Liljeblom in their 
Nordic study. While the study indicates that gender diversity (in other words, 
more women on the boards) is positive for high risk firms (contrary to earlier 
beliefs), the study also finds that the predominantly male CEOs tend to react 
negatively to female directors.72 
In other words, to the extent that negative effects on the value creation in the 
companies were caused in these first years after the introduction of compulsory 
gender diversity, the hostility of male CEOs and male directors to the 
mandatory quota rule may be a part of the explanation. Also, and linked with 
this, one may speculate that the women who agreed to sit on boards in the initial 
phase may not necessarily have been the most experienced and highly qualified. 
Some well qualified women may have been reticent about saying yes because 
of the opposition and because of a feeling of being appointed due to the quota 
rule rather than their qualifications.73 These and other factors may have 
contributed to transitional negative effects. As Morten Huse points out, female 
directors are not a homogeneous group. To the extent that one can generalise, 
Morten Huse indicates that female directors are more positive about the 
Norwegian quota rule after having been on boards for a while and that, with 
board experience, female directors have gained more business acumen and 
tended to become the type of directors that Huse denotes ‘value creators’.74 As 
pointed out by Gro Ladegård, there are overall no indications that the quota rule 
has reduced the competence or the legitimacy of the boards in general.75 
The Norwegian legislator intended to break up the ‘old boys’ club’ and combat 
the negative effects of group-think in a very homogeneous group. Logic 
suggests that widening the scope of the pool of potential directors from (a 
limited number of) men only to both men and women is positive. It is difficult 
71 Ibid. See also Sabina Nielsen and Morten Huse, ‘Women’s Contribution to Board Decision-
Making and Strategic Involvement: The Role of Equality Perceptions’ (2010) 7 European 
Management Review 16.  
72 Brunzell and Liljeblom, above n 66. 
73 Indeed, before the gender quota rule, only two per cent of Norwegian CEOs and only six per 
cent of the board members were women, so naturally not many women had what had been 
perceived as the only relevant background: CEO or boardroom experience: Morten Huse, 
‘Concluding Remarks to Part III’ in Machold et al (eds), above n 5, 94. 
74 Ibid 94–7. 
75 Gro Ladegård, ‘Legitimacy, Inclusion and Influence: Investigating Women Directors’ Board 
Experience’ in Machold et al (eds), above n 5, 152. 
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to envisage that gender diversity on the board after a transitional phase is 
anything but neutral or positive for the decision-making and value creation of 
the company. The impression derived from the tentative examination of studies 
supports this. In addition, there is a political choice to be made: rectifying 
gender imbalance may arguably be ethically and politically warranted, even if 
hostility towards such quotas and possible transitional problems bring with 
them negative economic effects.   
E Interrelated Effect on Financial, Social and 
Environmental Performance of Companies 
The different and positive qualities that women bring into a previously male-
dominated domain are probably especially relevant in the discussion of the 
impact of gender diversity on the broader societal performance of companies.  
The study by Renée Adams and Patricia Funk on the characteristic values of 
female directors, finding them more benevolent, universally concerned and less 
power-oriented than men,76 is based on a survey of Swedish directors and 
CEOs.77 This makes it especially relevant in a discussion of the probable impact 
of the Norwegian rule, as Norway and Sweden are culturally quite similar. A 
Dutch study by Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers (based on a resource-dependency 
perspective, where boards are seen as a mechanism to link companies and their 
‘stakeholders’) indicates that gender diversity on the board is a positive signal 
in the broader social context.78  
The abovementioned study by Matsa and Miller, indicated lower short-term 
profits in Norwegian companies because of a relative increase in labour costs.79 
This gives rise to the question of whether having more women in the boardroom 
will encourage the use of a longer-term and broader vision in matters of value-
creation within the company. Other studies, such as that by Richard Bernardi 
and Veronica Threadgill, also suggest a possible correlation between female 
directors and more community-oriented boards.80    
76 Adams and Funk, above n 50.  
77 Ibid. 
78 Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers, ‘Female Directors on Corporate Boards Provide Legitimacy to a 
Company: A Resource Dependency Perspective’ (2009) Management Online Review 1, 
available at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411693>. 
79 Matsa and Miller, above n 54.  
80 Richard A Bernardi and Veronica H Threadgill, ‘Women Directors and Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ (2010) 15(2) Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organizational Studies 
15, available at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1752267>. 
                                                 
46 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 20 NO 1 
 
Studies of the introduction of gender diversity into previously male-dominated 
areas suggest that gender (as well as age and cultural) diversity on company 
boards will lead to broader and more open discussions of the impact of the 
businesses on society. If diversity has any effect at all, it should have a positive 
effect on social performance of the company. It is difficult to envisage that 
breaking up the group-think of an ‘old boys’ club’ could be negative in that 
respect.  
Another possible significant effect of the quota rule is an improvement in 
gender equality in business. Early reports indicated an increase in the number 
of women attaining top-positions in businesses as a result of women becoming 
more visible in the aftermath of the law reform.81 Furthermore, the current 
criticism of the gender quota is that the rule has not sufficiently increased 
gender diversity in business in general. This is an indication that the most 
strident opposition to the Norwegian gender quota has calmed down.82 This 
seems to signal a new phase in which it is not the rule itself that is the object of 
criticism, but rather the perceived lack of significant broader, societal effects.   
F Does Gender Diversity Contribute to Sustainability? 
Arguably, the most important question with respect to gender diversity on 
boards is whether it contributes to the overarching societal goal of sustainability 
in all three dimensions: economic, social and environmental. This section 
concentrates on the environmental dimension. 
81 ‘Styrekvinner til toppjobber’ (‘Female board members into high-level positions’) Ukeavisen 
ledelse (Norwegian weekly newspaper), 18 April 2008. 
82 See, eg, Marianne Bertrand et al, ‘Breaking the Glass Ceiling? The Effect of Board Quotas on 
Female Labor Market Outcomes in Norway’ (Working Paper No 20256, NBER 2014) available 
at <www.nber.org/papers/w20256>. See also Cathrine Seierstad and Tore Opsahl, ‘For the Few 
Not the Many? The Effect of Affirmative Action on Presence, Prominence, and Social Capital 
of Women Directors in Norway’ (2010) 27(1) Scandinavian Journal of Management. Available 
at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1420639>. 
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The mainstream corporate governance debate tends to regard the maximisation 
of shareholder profit as the sole purpose of companies. However, as a matter of 
law, this is to a great extent incorrect, especially when the relevant ‘purpose’ is 
understood as society’s purpose for companies in the aggregate.83 No company 
law system insists on boards focusing only on returns to shareholders.84 All 
jurisdictions expect boards to ensure compliance with environmental 
regulation. Generally company law across jurisdictions also allow boards to 
integrate environmental externalities (beyond legal compliance) into their 
operations, at least as far as the business case argument allows — that is, as far 
as the case can be made that this is profitable for the company in the long run. 
Within the current system, company law across the jurisdictions provides 
perhaps surprising latitude to the board, and by extension the management, to 
shape business in a sustainable manner.85 
However, boards do not, by and large, choose the environmentally friendly, low 
carbon option even within the parameters of the business case, let alone 
challenge the outer boundaries of the scope to pursue profit in a sustainable 
manner. This is because of the overriding social norm of shareholder primacy, 
which, supported by management remuneration incentives and other drivers, 
leads to an extremely narrow, short-term, profit maximisation focus.86 The 
resulting practice of companies in the aggregate is detrimental to those affected 
by climate change and environmental degradation today, and to the possibility 
for future generations to fulfil their own needs. It is also damaging to any 
shareholder with more than a very short-term perspective on their investment,  
 
83 See Beate Sjåfjell et al, ‘Shareholder Primacy: the Main Barrier to Sustainable Companies’ in 
Beate Sjåfjell and Benjamin Richardson (eds), Company Law and Sustainability (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015).  
84 In some jurisdictions environmental sustainability has begun tentatively to make inroads into 
the explicit duties of the board. See, eg, Andrew Johnston, ‘Reforming English Company Law 
to Promote Sustainable Companies’ (2014) 11(2) European Company Law 63; Tineke 
Lambooy, Corporate Social Responsibility: Legal and Semi-Legal Frameworks Supporting 
CSR: Developments 2000 – 2010 and Case Studies (Kluwer, 2010) 107.  
85 The cross-jurisdictional analysis of the Sustainable Companies Project has shown that there is 
a great unexplored potential in the current company law regimes for companies to shift away 
from the path of business as usual and onto a path towards sustainability; see Matsa and Miller, 
above n 54.  
86 Pinpointed also by the EU Commission as a problem but not adequately acted on. See Beate 
Sjåfjell and Linn Anker-Sørensen, ‘Directors’ Duties and Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR)’ in Hanne S Birkmose, Mette Neville and Karsten Engsig Sørensen (eds), Boards of 
Directors in European Companies (Kluwer, 2013). 
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including institutional investors such as pension funds or sovereign wealth 
funds, as well as to the companies themselves.87  
While the case has been made elsewhere that company law reform is necessary 
to effect the required change,88 the pervasive question in the present context is 
whether gender diversity will facilitate a reorientation of the decision-making 
in the boardroom towards environmental objectives. 
Company law has tended to ignore the issue of environmental protection, based 
on the assumption that company law can leave it to environmental law to ensure 
ecological sustainability. This is contrary to the very essence of sustainable 
development. While environmental law is traditionally very much about anti-
pollution, about prohibiting or limiting the spread of toxic substances, 
sustainable development is a way of thinking. Sustainable development 
requires the balancing of the inextricable complexity of economic, social and 
environmental interests, within the non-negotiable ecological limits of our 
planet. The pursuit of growth in the business context tends to ignore the finite 
nature of the natural resources of our planet. The concept of planetary 
boundaries, while foreign in a company law context, forms the natural 
framework within which all business, our economies and societies must find a 
peaceful and sustainable way to coexist.89  
87 While the preamble of the proposal for an amendment of the Shareholder Rights’ Directive 
claims in Recital 2 that the financial crisis has ‘revealed that shareholders in many cases 
supported managers’ excessive short-term risk taking’, an at least equally valid concern is that 
shareholders have put pressure on directors and managers to focus on short-term returns only.  
88 Beate Sjåfjell, ‘Corporate Governance for Sustainability: The Necessary Reform of EU 
Company Law’ in Beate Sjåfjell and Anja Wiesbrock (eds), The Greening of European 
Business under EU Law (Routledge, 2015) 97.  
89 See Johan Rockström et al, ‘Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for 
Humanity’ (2009) 14(2) Ecology and Society <www.ecologyandsociety.org/ 
vol14/iss2/art32/>; Will Steffen et al, ‘Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on 
a Changing Planet’, Science, 347 (6223) (2015) (January 2015), available at 
<www.sciencemag.org/content/347/6223/1259855.abstract>. 
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Source: Will Steffen et al, ‘Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a 
Changing Planet (2015)90  
 
Based on the general indications that female directors take broader and longer-
term perspectives discussed in this section, as well as the general positive 
impact of breaking up group-think indicated in this article, we may envisage 
that gender diversity on corporate boards is a small but positive contribution to 
the necessary transition away from business as usual and onto a sustainable 
path.91 
90 Steffen, above n 89. The planetary boundaries include, as shown above and in addition to 
climate change and biodiversity loss: global freshwater and land use, chemical pollution, ocean 
acidification, atmospheric aerosol loading, stratospheric ozone depletion, and cycling of 
phosphorus and nitrogen. It is estimated that humanity has already transgressed four 
boundaries: climate change, biosphere integrity (genetic diversity, with uncertainty concerning 
the boundary for functional diversity), and land system change, and biogeochemical cycles 
(phosphorus and nitrogen): ibid. The planetary boundaries may be revised through new 
evidence, and scientific uncertainty is naturally unavoidable. The environmental precautionary 
principle is of the essence. Indeed, the conceptual framework for planetary boundaries itself 
proposes a strongly precautionary approach, by ‘setting the discrete boundary value at the lower 
and more conservative bound of the uncertainty range’: Johan Rockström et al, ‘Supplementary 
Information’ (2009) <www.stockholmresilience.org/> (under Research; planetary boundaries). 
91 For the argument of the necessity of such a transition, see, eg, Sjåfjell, above n 88.  
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This article poses the question of whether the example of Norway is a way 
forward for other jurisdictions. From a corporate governance perspective the 
answer seems to be yes. Boardroom gender diversity has such a positive effect 
that it should be sought to be achieved, through mandatory legislation if 
necessary. Whether mandatory legislation is necessary depends on time and 
place.92 Certainly mandatory norms often seem to be necessary to change a 
path-dependent outcome. The Norwegian legislative initiative seems to be an 
example in practice of what Jon Elster discusses regarding social norms: a 
change in social norms (which social perceptions will be based on) often needs 
a legal norm to start if off.93  
The much criticised and ‘radical’ piece of Norwegian legislation has indeed 
sparked a Europe-wide debate. That mandatory legal norms are often necessary 
in contexts such as those under discussion in this article is also illustrated by 
the example of Germany. Although gender diversity is on the rise on aggregate 
in Europe, according to the EU Commission,94 the proportion of women on 
German supervisory boards has actually declined, despite all the debates about 
equality and promises by German companies to rectify this situation on a 
voluntary basis.95 The only positive change seems to be in the listed companies, 
which is probably a sign of acceptance (or resignation) in the face of the quota 
legislation now adopted in Germany, which will enter into force in 2016.96  
To achieve the positive effects of gender diversity, a certain critical mass must 
be reached. This does not necessarily have to be 40 per cent, as is the Norwegian 
rule. One Norwegian study by Beate Elstad and Gro Ladegård emphasises the 
importance of a certain ratio of women in overcoming the social barriers against 
92 An interesting, comparative discussion of this may be found in Jean du Plessis, Ingo Saenger 
and Richard Foster, ‘Board Diversity or Gender Diversity? Perspectives from Europe, Australia 
and South Africa’ (2012) 17(2) Deakin Law Review 207. 
93 See Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) 358–9. The example Elster uses is smoking, and the change 
in the societal attitude to smoking sparked by legal restrictions on where smoking is permitted. 
If bans on smoking in restaurants etc were lifted today, the social norm against smoking in 
places where it affects other people, such as when visiting somebody’s home, would probably 
not revert back to the former social attitude that smoking is only the smoker’s business. 
94 European Commission, above n 36.  
95 ‘Inequality Still Presides for Women in German Boardrooms’ Deutsche Welle (online), 9 
October 2014 <dw.de/inequality-still-presides-for-women-in-german-boardrooms/a-17985 
476>.  
96 ‘Germany to Legislate 30 Percent Quota for Women on Company Boards’ Deutsche Welle 
(online), 26 November 2014 <dw.de/germany-to-legislate-30-percent-quota-for-women-on-
company-boards/a-18088840>. 
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female directors in a male-dominated setting, and indicating that the benefits of 
gender diversity may materialise at a ratio below 40 per cent.97 A German study 
by Jasmin Joecks, Kerstin Pull and Karin Vetter indicates that a 30 per cent 
ratio is a minimum,98 while the Norwegian study by Mariateresa Torchia 
indicates that the critical mass is three women.99 The important thing is to avoid 
‘trophy directors’ and to ensure that real change is achieved. 
The pervasive question of how to regulate companies so that they contribute to 
the necessary, fundamental transition away from business as usual and onto a 
sustainable path is more challenging. Boardroom diversity is most likely a 
positive but insufficient contribution to this end. Lest we end up fiddling while 
the world burns, we need to keep our eyes on the overarching goal of long-term 
sustainability, financial and social, within the planetary boundaries. At the end 
of the day, that and nothing else is the benchmark against which we should be 
measured. 
97 Beate Elstad and Gro Ladegård, ‘Women on Corporate Boards: Key Influencers or Tokens?’ 
(2010) 16(4) Journal of Management and Governance, available at SSRN 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1582368>. 
98 Jasmin Joecks, Kerstin Pull and Karin Vetter, ‘Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm 
Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass”?’ (2012), available at SSRN 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2009234>. It is not surprising then that the new German rule aims for 
the minimum indicated by this German study, namely 30 per cent; see n 32.  
99 Mariateresa Torchia, ‘Women Directors and Corporate Innovations: A Critical Mass 
Perspective’ in Machold et al (eds), above n 5, 126. 
                                                 
